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COMMENTS
VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF HUSBAND FOR TORTS OF HIS
SPOUSE
*. and they" shall be two in one flesh."
-Genesis ii, 24.
I. INTRODUCTION
In handing down the decision in Rogers v. Newby 1 in July of 1949 the
Florida Supreme Court neglected an opportunity to change the jurisprudence
of this state on a subject in which Florida is Victorian. The certified question
"Whether Chapter 21932, LAWS OF FLoRIDA, Acts of 1943, § 708.08, FLORIDA
STATUTES 1941, relieves a husband of liability for the 'pure' torts of his wife"
was answered in the negative by the supreme court and by their reply they re-
fused to let Florida join with the great majority of her sister states who do not
impose vicarious liability on the husband.
It is proposed to show, first, the statutory history of Florida in regards
to married women's property; second, the common law rules relating to the
subject; third, how the other states treat and have treated this problem; and
fourth, what Florida can and should do in this respect.
II. HISTORY
Provisions in our constitutions since statehood were scant in any reference
to married women's property. In the FLORIDA CONSTITUTION OF 1861, § 21
of Art. IV, there was a simple provision that ". . . no law shall be made allow-
ing married women or minors to contract or to manage their estates . . ." and
in the CONSTITUTION OF 1865, § 19, Art. IV, this provision was revised to omit
any reference to married women. This hiatus was eliminated in the CONSTITU-
TIONJ OF 1868, § 26 of Art. IV where it was provided that "All property ...
of the wife ... shall be her separate property and not liable for the debts of her
husband." Our present constitution provides that a married woman's property
shall not be liable for her husband's debts but certain charges can be enforced
against her separate estate. 2 The Married Women's Property Act abrogates the
common law disabilities of married women.3 By § 708.02 the wife is the owner
of all property she held before marriage, and all that is acquired under cover-
1. 41 So.2d 451 (Fla. 1949).
2. FLA. CONST. Art. XI, §§ 1, 2 (1886).
3. FLA. STAT. C. 708 (1941).
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ture by gift, devise, bequest, descent or purchase; and this property shall be
liable for her debts but not for the debts of her husband. Section 708.05 holds
the husband not liable for the debts of the wife contracted before marriage,
but her separate property is liable for such debts. Further, a married woman
is entitled to all wages and earnings acquired by her in any employment sepa-
rate from her husband and they are considered as her separate property and
subject to her own disposal. She may sue for and recover them as though she
were a single woman.4 In 1943 a statute was approved which provided that
every married woman is empowered to sue and be sued as if single, to hold and
manage all her property, and to act in all ways as a feme sole, excepting it is
still necessary for the husband to join in the conveyance of her property. 5
However, in refusing to construe the Married Women's Property Act as abro-
gating the common law rule, the court advanced the provisions of the act
which preserve to the wife the protections she has enjoyed, such as support
and maintenance, dower, and the necessity of joinder by her husband in all
conveyances and encumbrances of her separate estate. The court also said,
"We think it cannot be said that because of this act a husband and his wife now
tread their separate and independent paths in all respects. It is still perfectly
natural for them to reside in a common home and raise a family, the success of
the whole enterprise being the result of the efforts of both, he in the mart and
she in the home. By such an arrangement it is the usual case that the material
things which are garnered during their life together often stand in his name.
...Her potential interest in their joint material wealth, carried in his name,
would not be subject to a judgment against her for damages flowing from
torts she committed." 6
In distinguishing the ability of a married woman to contract the court
held that if one contracts with a married woman lie does so voluntarily; lie is
easily informed of what he is about and can advise himself at the outset
whether any damage which might eventually arise from a breach of the con-
tract could be collected from her separate property. But the injury to one
resulting from a tortious act is quite another matter. This is obviously in-
voluntary on the part of the injured person.
III. COMMON LAw
The unquestioned rule at common law was that a husband was liable,
either jointly or solely, for all torts committed by his wife during coverture.7
4. FLA. STAT. § 708.06 (1941).
5. FLA. STAT. § 708.08 (1941).
6. Rogers v. Newby, supro at 452.
7. 2 KENT. COMM. 149. Blackstone in his Commentaries, c. 15, p. 445, after stating
the principal legal effects of marriage, observed that ". . . even the disabilities which the
wife lies under are for the most part intended for her protection and benefit; so great a
favorite is the female sex of the laws of England."
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This liability also extended to all torts committed by the woman before mar-
riage as long as she was not the wife of another man.8 There are some excep-
tions to this liability on the part of the husband, since it covered only his wife's
"simpliciter" or "pure" torts, that is torts not arising from or mixed with any
element of contract, since the "real injury flows from her non-compliance with
her engagement, and an action to recover compensation for it, if maintainable,
gives equal effect to her contract, no matter in what form the action may be
brought, whether in form ex contractu or ex delicto. It practically enforces
it." 9
Another exception to the general rule is that a married woman cannot be
liable for the torts of an agent, even if she is living apart from her husband.10
The reason seems to be that she cannot be liable for a tort mixed with an ele-
ment of contract as to which she is under disability to enter into. A further
reason is that she is under disability to contract for the services of an agent.
The husband is liable even though the tort was committed out of his
presence, without his knowledge or consent, against his will or even while
the spouses are living separate and apart.' 1 A wife, however, is not liable for
a tort committed by her in the presence and under the coercion of her husband :
it is his tort, and he alone is liable.' 2 Some statutes, in making a married woman
liable for her separate torts, and relieving her husband from liability therefor,
except torts committed by her under his coercion.'1 The common law rule
is that the husband's presence raises a rebuttable presumption of his direction
and coercion. However, it may be shown, so as to render the wife jointly
liable, that she acted of her own volition. A fortiori, she is liable if her act, al-
though committed in the presence of her husband, is against his will and com-
mand.' 4
The common law liability of a husband for the torts of his wife is not a
personal liability in the sense that his liability for his own torts is personal to
him; it is because he is entitled to the personalty and the usufruct of the realty
of the wife, and because she could not be sued.15 The cases also hold that this
liability depended upon a de jure marriage.'4 Even though the liability of the
husband includes torts occurring before marriage as well as those which arise
during coverture, he is liable only while the parties remain married to each
other. His liability ceases if she predeceases him, or if the marriage is termi-
nated by a decree of divorce, or, in some cases, if a decree of judicial separa-
& Culmer v. Wilson, 13 Utah 129, 44 Pat. 883 (1896).
9. Keen v. Hartman, 48 Pa. 497 (1865).
10. Ferguson v. Neilson, 17 R.I. 81, 20 Atd. 229 (1890).
11. Edwards v. Wessinger, 65 S.C 161, 43 S.E. 518 (1903). Contra: McClure v.
MeMarter, 104 La. 496, 29 So. 227 (1901).
12. Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Heil, 115 Pa. 487, 8 Atl. 616 (1887).
13. Landry v. Richmond, 45 R.I. 504, 124 Atl. 263 (1924).
14. Note 12, suipra.
15. Wolf v. Keagg. 33 Del. 362, 136 Ad. 520 (1927).
.16. Note. 74 U. oF PA. L. REv. 305 (1926).
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tion is obtained before the action is brought to enforce the liability of the hus-
band. Moreover, an action against him abates if she dies during its pendency,
and the husband's liability does not survive as against his estate regardless of
whether he dies before suit or before judgment in a pending suit.17
A husband's liability for compensatory damages is recognized at the com-
mon law when he is held liable for the torts of his wife. She is liable, in a
proper case, for punitive damages. In some cases his liability for such punitive
damages is denied since her wrong is not imputed to him. The broad general
rule has been laid down, however, that where a husband is liable for'the torts
of his wife, he is liable therefor to the same extent that she would be liable if
she alone were answerable; hence, punitive damages would be recoverable in
a proper case.'
8
At common law, husband and wife were sued jointly for her individual
torts, and she could be sued alone if she survived him, she alone remaining
liable if he died before suit was brought. The common law liability of the hus-
band would render him, it seems, subject to civil arrest as though he himself
had committed the tort.19 Under this common law rule of joint liability of hus-
band and wife, judgment is rendered against both of them. The judgment can
be enforced first against the separate property of the wife, in most jurisdictions,
before the property of the husband is levied upon.20 The wife, at common law,
under no circumstances was liable for the debts or torts of her husband.21
The reasons stated for this rule of vicarious liability are many and varied.
More than likely some of the real reasons have been lost in antiquity. The most
common are, that the husband, at common law, had the power of correcting
his wife, and therefore he was responsible for her conduct; that, since he has
the control of her property, he should be answerable for her wrongs; and that,
since she cannot be sued alone, the injured party would be without redress
unless the husband is held liable with her.2 2 It has been thought that the rule
is mainly the result of the supposition that the acts of the wife are the result of
the superior will and influence of the husband, which fact makes it difficult for
a court to determine when she has acted freely and when she has acted at his
dictation or direction. Another reason asserted for the rule, still deemed to
exist, is the headship of the husband in the family.23 Bracton is alleged to have
originated the vogue of entity in husband and wife, that they are one, and
17. Edwards v. Wessinger, 65 S.C. 161, 43 S.E. 518 (1903).
18. Sargean v. Fedor, 3 N.J. Misc. 832, 130 Ati. 207 (Sup. Ct. 1925). Contra: Price
v. Clapp, 119 Tenn. 425, 105 S.W. 864 (1907).
19. Hall v. White, 27 Conn. 488 (1858).
20. Gill v. State, 39 W. Va. 479. 20 S.E. 568 (1894). Contra: Stanley v. Powers.
123 Fla. 359, 166 So. 843 (1936) (Constitutional provision authorizing sale of married
woman's separate estate [realty and personalty) for specified obligations held inapplicable
to judgment against married woman in tort action.)
21. Multer v. Knibbs, 193 Mass. 556, 79 N.E. 762 (1907).
.22. Meeks v. Johnston, 85 Fla. 248, 95 So. 670 (1923).
23. Rogers v. Newby, supra at 452: "We apprehend, too, that despite the act, the man
remains the head of the family."
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thus the wife is not capable of being separately liable. 2' In fact, the notion of
conjugal unity has a biblical origin, the quotation from Genesis ii, 24, being
found in the New Testament in Matt. XIX, 5-6.25 There can be no doubt that
it was this theological metaphor that produced the legal maxim. The duty of a
husband to protect and provide for his wife, in return for her services to him,
has been said to include the acceptance of the liability for her torts. A more prac-
tical contention seems to be that since a wife had no separate property at com-
mon law from which successful litigants could recover judgments, the husband
should be a necessary party to an otherwise fruitless suit. Another logical
suggestion appears to be that the rule arose from a procedural necessity of
joining the husband in an action against the wife, since at common law the
married woman could not sue or be sued in her own name. This procedural
maxim itself quite probably arose from the venerable entity theory.2
If the entity theory were true, then a statute giving a married woman
the right to sue and be sued in her own name, as the Florida statute does,
would abrogate the common law rule in regard to the husband's tort liability.
This would seem to follow logically if it is true that the unity of the husband
and wife is the reason for the rule, as many of the authorities believe. The
Florida court in Prentiss v. Paisley 27 said, "His (the husband's) liability
for her (the wife's) torts is a result of the mere fact that by the common law
rule suit cannot be maintained against the wife alone during coverture." If
this dicta expresses the true reason for upholding the common law rule in
Florida then the basis for the rule has ceased, since the wife can now be
sued in her name, and the rule should cease.
IV. UNDER STATUTE
The statutes of twenty-three states have definite provisions which abrogate
the vicarious liability of the husband for the torts of his wife. 28 The District
of Columbia,29 Alaska 30 and England 31 also have statutes which have elimi-
24. 6 BRACTON, DE LEcIBUs ANGLlAE (1883) 392: "A husband and wife are as if one
person, being one flesh and one blood."
25. Mark X, 8 also quotes Genesis ii, 24.
26. Comment, 32 MtNN. L. REV. 262-92 (1948).
27. 25 Fla. 927, 930, 7 So. 56 (1890); Greene v. Miller, 102 Fla. 767, 136 So. 532
(1931).
28. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 34, §§ 69-70 (1940) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 68, § 4 (1934) ; IND.
ANN. STAT. § 38-105 (Burns 1933); IOwA CODE § 597.19 (1946) ; ME. Rav. STAT. C.
153, § 38 (1944) ; MD. Asx. CoE GEN. LAWS art. 45 § 5 (1939) ; MAss. GE.. LAWS e,
209 § 8 (1932); MICn. COaMP. LAWS § 612.7 (1948); MINN. STAT, ANN. § 519.05 (1947);
Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3680 (1939); MONT. Rav. CODE ANN. § 36-109 (1947); N.J.
STAT. ANN. tit. 37:2-8 (1940); N.Y. CAHILL'S CONSoL. LAWS C. 14 § 57 (19,41) ; N.C.
Rav. STAT. § 52-15 (1943) ; N.D. REv. CODE § 14-0708 (1943); OHIo GEN. CODE ANN.
§ 8001 (1939); OKLA. STAT. tit. 32 § 9 (1941) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 417 §§ 9-12 (1938) ;
UTAh COtP. LAWS § 2528 (1888); VT. STAT. REV. § 3169 (1947); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 55-37 (1950) ; W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 4750 (1949).
29, D.C. CODE § 30-208 (1940).
30. ALASKA ComP. LAWS ANN, § 21-2-9 (1949).
31. Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act of 1935, § 1 (b) (c). LAWS
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nated the husband from all such liability. Many statutes have abolished the
husband's liability by express provisions. 32 Some statutes, by their terms, relieve
the husband from liability for torts of his wife in which he does not participate
or take part.83 And others provide that neither spouse is answerable for the acts
of the other.34 The court said in Brazilee v. Scott,"5 "It is archaic to insist on
holding the erstwhile head of the family responsible for the acts of a woman
equal to him at the polls, in the race for political preferment, and in all avenues
of business and commerce and force him to respond in damages for her crimes
and misdemeanors." The above quoted passage seems to typify the opinions of
the courts on this subject. Under the majority of these statutes the husband is
still liable if the tort was committed under his direction, coercion, or if he
in any way participates. However, there shall be no presumption of his
direction as at the common law, but direct proof of such coercion must be
offered and proved. 6
Under the various Married Women's Property Acts which have generally
removed the woman's common law disabilities, it has been usually held that
they also abrogated the common law rule in regards to a husband's liability
for his wife's torts. The husband's vicarious liability for his wife's torts has
been held to have been abrogated under statutes providing that the husband
has no estate or interest in his wife's property 87 and under statutes removing
the general disabilities and privileges of coverture. Under statutes enabling the
wife to become a sole trader the husband is not liable for torts committed by
the wife in the course of her own business or arising from the management
and control of her separate property. 8 Statutes enabling a married woman to
contract generally, to deal with property, and to sue and be sued as a feme sole
or any person sui juris, are construed to make the wife alone, and not her
husband, liable for her separate torts. The reasons for the common law rule-
the merger of the wife's legal existence in that of her husband, his right to her
property, and the fact that she could not be sued alone-having ceased to
exist, the husband's liability also has ceased.5 9 In eleven states,40 and in
OF ENrGLAND (Replacement) Supp. 1153-1158 (1949). Prior to this law, England had
held under the general married women's property act that the husband remained liable.
32. Mich., supra; Mass., supra.
33. Me., supra.
34. Ohio, supra.
35. 273 S.W. 1013, 1015 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
36. Tanzer v. Reed, 160 App. Div. 584, 145 N.Y. Supp. 708 (Sup. Ct. 1st Dept. 1914).
37. Schuler v. Henry, 42 Colo. 367, 94 Pac. 360 (1908).
38. Harrington v. Jagnetly, 83 N.J.L. 548, 83 At. 880 (1912).
39. Harris v. Webster, 58 N.H. 481 (1878).
40. ARK. ANN. STAT. § 55-401 (1947), Bourland v. Baker, 141 Ark. 280, 216 S.W.
707 (1919) ; COLO. STAT. ANrN. c. 108 § 2 (1935). Schuler v. Henry, 42 Colo. 367, 94 Pac.
360 (1908); DEL. REv. CODE c. 87 § 3541 (1935), Wolf v. Keagg, 33 Del. 362, 136 Atl.
520 (1927); GA. CODE ANN. § 4413 (1946), Durden v. Maddox, 73 Ga. App. Rep. 491,
37 S.E.2d 219 (1946); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 23-201 (1935), Norris v. Corkill, 32 Kan.
409, 4 Pac. 862 (1884) : Ky. REv. STAT. § 404.010 (1949), Lane v. Bryant, 100 Ky. 138,
37 S.W. 548 (1896); N.H. REv. LAWS c. 340 § 2 (1942), Coplan v. Coplan, 83 N.H. 310,
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Alberta,41 Australia,42 Ontario 4" and Quebec 44 the courts have interpreted the
married women property acts as abrogating the common law liability of the
husband for the torts of his spouse.
Under the Spanish Community Property system the property of one
spouse, whether it was the separate property or a respective share of the
community property, was not liable for torts committed by the other spouse.45
The community property law of the states which have adopted that system,
follows, with some modification, the system of community property of Spain.
The common law view of the disabilities of the wife did not exist in the
Spanish community property idea, for the wife not only was a separate person
in her own right, but also she had or could have her own separate property
and owned an existing half share in the common property. Therefore, she
could be held responsible for her own tortious acts, and recovery could be
had from her own separate property or property interests. Neither the separate
property of the husband nor his share of the common property was liable for
the wife's torts.46 In the eight community property states 47 and in Hawaii, 4'
the community is liable only for the torts of a spouse while on a mission for or
in benefit of the community. Husbands are not responsible solely upon the
basis of marriage and their separate property is not liable for suit or judgment
for the torts of the wife unconnected with the community interests of both.
The theory of agency could be stretched by judicial interpretation, in order to
hold almost all acts done by the spouse within the scope of benefiting the
community property; but the courts have not done so. The tendency is, rather,
142 Ad. 121 (1928); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 111 (1931); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8572
(1932), Bryant v. Smith, 107 S.C. 453, 198 S.E. 20 (1939) ; S.D. CODE §§ 14.0206-14.0207
(1939), Bibant v. Pense, 35 S.D. 14, 150 N.W. 289 (1914); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8459
(1934), Foster v. Ingle, 147 Tenn. 217, 246 S.W. 530 (1923).
41. Stat. of 1875 gave married women right to sue and be sued. Held in Quinn v.
Beales, 20 Alberta L.R. 620, 4 D.L.R. 635 (1924), husband not liable for torts of wife.
42. Brown v. Halloway, 10 C.L.R. (Aust.) 89 (1909). In construing the exact act
which England held did not abrogate common law rule, this court held that the married
women's property act did.
43. Lee v. Hopkins, 20 Ont. Rep. 666 (1890). Liability is limited to the extent of
property of his wife acquired by him subject to certain deductions.
44. Theoret v. Allen, Rap. Jud. Quebec 43 C.S. 401 (1913). Husband not liable for
torts of wife when not commanded, authorized or participated in by him.
45. 1 DE FUNIAX, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPFETY § 181 (1st ed. 1943).
46. 1 DE FUNIAK, op. cit. supra note 45, § 183. A Florida statute, FLA. STAT. 708.01
(1941) reserved to all persons married while East and West Florida was under the civil
laws of Spain all property rights acquired thereby.
47. ARIz. CODE ANN. § 63-303 (1939), Hogeman v. Vanderdoes, 15 Ariz. 312, 138
Pac. 1053 (1914) ; CALIF. Civ. CODE § 171a (1949), McClain v. Tufts, 83 Calif. App. 176,
181 P.2d 818 (1947) ; LA. Civ. CODE Rav. art. 2317-art. 2320 (1945), Aetna Casualty and
Surety Co. v. Simms, 200 So. 34 (La. App. 1941) ; NEB. SEss. LAws C. 156 (1947), Goher
v. Dallugge. 72 Neb. 16, 99 NW. 818 (1904) ; Nev. CoMP. LAWS § 3371.01 (Supp. 1941),
Slack v. Schwartz, 63 Nev. 47, 161 P.2d 345 (1945) ; OaR, CODE Ann. § 33-214 (1930);
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. § 4613 (1940), Seinsheimer v. Burkhart, 132 Tex. Civ. 336,
122 S.W.2d 1063 (1939): WAsH. Rav. STAT. § 6904 (1940), Sandgren v. West, 9 Wash.
2d 494, 115 P.2d 724 (1941).
48. HAWAII REv. LAWS § 12391.13(c) (1945).
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to restrict the liability of the community for the tortious acts of either the
husband or wife.
49
Three states, Connecticut, Florida and Wyoming, either have construed
their married women's property acts as still holding the husband liable for the
torts of his wife, or the acts carry express provisions to that effect. The Con-
necticut statute 50 allows a wife to sue and be sued in her own name in tort,
but it would seem that the husband is still liable, since such a statute alone is
usually not construed to free the husband from the common law burden. There
are no decisions under this statute. Florida now has by court decision decided
that its Married Women's Property Act does not abrogate the common law
rule of liability without fault.51 In Wyoming 52 the husband is not liable for
torts committed in regards to his wife's separate estate where there is no
question of agency, ratification, participation or consent. However, when any
judgment is rendered against a husband and wife for the tort of the wife, execu-
tion on the judgment shall first be levied on the separate property of the wife,
if she has any, and then on the husband's property. So, the husband still
remains liable if the wife is without any assets.
There are four states which have no definite statutory provisions in regards
to tort liability of the husband and which also do not have any court decisions
on the subject. In Idaho,53 a community property state, neither husband nor
wife is liable for the other's previous debts; but the question of torts is left
unanswered. New Mexico, 5' another community property state, says that a
husband shall not be liable for his wife's premarital debts. Wisconsin, " has
a Married Women's Property Act, but it is silent as to removing the hus-
band's common law liabilities. Mississippi 66 also has removed the disabilities
of coverture but whether the act would be construed to cover the husband's
vicarious liability must await a court decision. Since the modern trend in all
of these states is to raise the woman to an equal plane with that of the man,
most courts hold that such an act as Mississippi's would release the husband
from liability as well as grant to the wife privileges she did not enjoy before.
And whereas the other community property states have adopted the Spanish
theory of the spouse's separate liability by judicial interpretation, it is
supposed that Idaho and New Mexico will do so if the need arises.
49. McClain v. Tufts, 83 Cal. App. 176, 178-179, 187 P.2d 818, 819 (1947) in which
the court said, "In fact, to hold the community property for the wife's torts would be
not only an unwarranted interference with, and infringement upon, the husband's right to
management and control, but it would also permit his property to be taken for what is,
to him, a non-existent liability."
50. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7307 (1949 Rev.).
51. Rogers v. Newby, supra.
52. Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. § 50-208 (1945).
53. IDAHO CoD ANN. § 32-911 (1948).
54. N.M. STAT. ANN. §65-308 (1941).
55. Wis. STAT. § 246.07 (1947).
56. MIss. CODE AWN. § 451 (1942).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Florida court could have construed § 708.08 '7 as giving equal lia-
bilities as well as equal rights to the married woman. Many courts have inter-
preted essentially the same language in their statutes as is in Florida's, to free
the husband from the vicarious liability for the torts of his wife which the com-
mon law imposed upon him. The foundation for such an interpretation in
Florida was laid in 1932 when the court decided the case of Banfield v. Adding-
ton,8 in which it was said:
At common law the husband had almost absolute control over the
wife's person; was entitled as the result of their marriage, to her society,
services, and earnings, to have her goods and chattels; had a right to reduce
her choses in action to possession during her life, could collect the rents and
profits of her real estate, and had entire control over her property. She was
bound to obey her husband, was incapable of making contracts except for
necessities, so that in law they were regarded as but one person. As a
necessary consequence he alone was liable, and could be sued, for her
torts and frauds committed during coverture in his presence or by procure-
ment; otherwise they were jointly liable and must be so sued. The only torts
for which a wife could be sued at common law, and judgment rendered
against her, were torts unmixed with any element of contract, or, in other
words, her pure torts.
But the foregoing view of the legal relationship of husband and wife is
no longer warranted, when by modern conditions and through modern statu-
tory provisions the wife has been emancipated with respect to her personal
wages and earnings. Where the reason for a rule of the common law, which
is the soul and spirit of that law, fails, the rule itself fails. It is only logical and
just therefore that the courts take cognizance of those new conditions, which,
by their necessary implication, have modified the factors necessary to sup-
port pre-existing restrictions on the legal liabilities under the common law.
The court itself has just recently declared itself in line with a judicial
recognition of such changed conditions, statutory implications, and necessary
modifications as affecting the rights and liabilities of married women. See
the case of Hoover v. Hoover, 138 So. 373, 374 (1931 ), lately decided by the
court, when Mr. Justice Terrell, in delivering the opinion of the court, re-
ferred to the fact that 'the modern rule in almost every state in this country
has relaxed the old common law doctrine of coverture.' (Emphasis added).
The court, in upholding the husband's liability for his spouse's torts, said
that if the husband was not jointly liable with the wife for her torts, the injured
party would not be able to collect on a judgment against the wife alone since
so often she has no separate property. However, how many judgments go
unsatisfied because the defendant, not a married woman, has no property on
which execution can be levied? If a married woman is to be given equal rights
and civil privileges she should also accept the equal responsibilities which are
the reciprocal part of the legal status.
EILEEN ELLIS MURPHY
57. FLA. STAT, § 708.08 (1941).
58. 104 Fla. 661, 663, 140 So. 893, 895, (1932).
